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Abstract
Advocates of the New Mechanicism in philosophy of science argue that
scientific explanation often consists in describing mechanisms responsible
for natural phenomena. Despite its successes, one might think that this
approach does not square with the ontological strictures of quantum
mechanics. New Mechanists suppose that mechanisms are composed of
objects with definite properties, which are interconnected via local causal
interactions. Quantum mechanics calls these suppositions into question.
Since mechanisms are hierarchical it appears that even macroscopic
mechanisms   must   supervene   on   a   set   of   “objects”   that   behave   nonclassically. In this paper we argue, in part by appeal to the theory of
quantum decoherence, that the universal validity of quantum mechanics
does not undermine neo-mechanistic ontological and explanatory claims as
they occur within in classical domains. Additionally, we argue that by
relaxation of certain classical assumptions, mechanistic explanatory
strategies can sometimes be carried over into the quantum domain.
In the last fifteen years there has been a good deal of attention focused on the idea of
mechanism as a central organizing principle for understanding both ontological and
explanatory questions in the sciences. A group of philosophers of science often called
the New Mechanists have argued that most of the phenomena that scientists seek to
explain are the product of the operation of mechanisms, where mechanisms are
understood as collections of objects (the parts of the mechanism) that are organized in
such a way as to be productive of the phenomena in question.
Our goal in this paper is to explore how well this neo-mechanistic worldview
coheres with the picture of nature that we derive from quantum mechanics. There is
prima facie reason to be concerned that the two pictures do not fit well together. The
neo-mechanists suppose that mechanisms are composed of objects with definite
properties, where these objects are connected to each other via local causal interactions.
Quantum mechanics (QM) calls into question whether there are really such things as
objects with definite properties and whether causal relations can be understood in terms
of local interactions between such objects. Moreover, mechanisms are hierarchical in
the sense that the parts of mechanisms may themselves be complex objects composed of
subparts which are components of lower level mechanisms. It seems then that even
complex   macroscopic   mechanisms   must   supervene   on   a   set   of   “objects”   that   behave  
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non-classically. This dependence upon a non-classical micro-level might seem to infect
the ontological and even explanatory claims of the New Mechanists.
Our judgment is that a more careful description of the relationship between
mechanisms and quantum mechanical phenomena will show that these concerns are ill
founded. Despite real differences between quantum mechanical and classical
ontologies, we shall argue that the phenomenon of quantum decoherence accounts for
the emergence of classical objects and properties, and that these objects and properties
provide an appropriate ontological grounding for mechanistic explanation.1
Furthermore, notwithstanding the differences between quantum mechanical and
classical ontologies, there are important analogies between some quantum mechanical
explanations and classical mechanistic explanations that allow us to legitimately speak
of quantum-mechanical mechanisms.2
Our paper will proceed as follows: We begin in part I with a characterization of the
ontological claims of the New Mechanists. In part II, we summarize important nonclassical features of QM and discuss how these are plausibly interpreted as posing a
threat to the New Mechanist agenda. In part III, we examine the theory of quantum
decoherence, a kind of analysis of quantum mechanical systems which provides insight
into why many macroscopic systems behave classically. In part IV, we discuss how
decoherence can be appealed to defuse the worries in part II – thus providing
ontological and explanatory legitimacy to mechanistic explanations of classically
behaving systems. Finally, in part V, we consider how to apply mechanistic strategies to
the explanation of systems that do not behave classically.

1

The Ontological Claims of the New Mechanists

Beginning in the 1990s, and especially since the publication of the widely cited paper
“Thinking   about   Mechanisms” (Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000), philosophers of
science have paid an increasing amount of attention to the concept of mechanism and its
role in scientific inquiry. The New Mechanists have argued that many scientists across a
range of disciplines understand their work as involving the discovery and description of
mechanisms responsible for the production of the phenomena that they study. It is often
pointed out that an account of scientific activity that gives centrality to the concept of
mechanism is more descriptively adequate in most sciences than one that focuses on
scientific laws; accordingly, the New Mechanists argue that activities such as model and
theory construction, testing, explanation and prediction must be recast in a mechanistic
light.
It is a challenge to clearly identify the ontological claims of the New Mechanists. There
are terminological and sometimes substantive disagreements among the New
Mechanists, and their ontological positions have shifted somewhat since their first
publications (Bechtel & Richardson 1993, Glennan 1996, Machamer et al 2000). A
1
While our discussion of the philosophical implications of decoherence theory focuses on the New
Mechanists, much of what we say may be relevant to a broader class of views that hold that macroscopic
objects are ontologically legitimate and explanatorily central.
2
The central argument of this paper does not depend upon the technical details of quantum
mechanics and decoherence, so our aim in this paper will be to present the argument in a non-technical
form, comprehensible to the non-specialist. For more precise formulations of decoherence, see
Schlosshauer 2007 and Joos et al. 2003.
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detailed discussion of these disagreements and shifts is beyond the scope of this paper.
We will limit ourselves to a description of the points about which the New Mechanists
(as expressed in their recent work) appear to be in agreement, together our own
elaboration of what we take to be the most plausible ontological picture that is
consistent with this consensus position.
One of the tasks that have occupied the New Mechanists is to give a concise but
informative characterization of what a mechanism is (see, e.g., Bechtel and Abrahamsen
2005; Glennan 1996, 2002; Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000). One way to summarize
the mechanistic consensus is this: Mechanisms consist of parts (entities, components)
that are so organized that the activities and interactions of these entities are productive
of a phenomenon.
There are several features of the consensus that are relevant to understanding the
ontological presuppositions of the New Mechanists. First, mechanisms consist of
discrete parts. As Glennan (2008, 378) writes,  “By  calling  parts   ‘entities’ or ‘objects,’
mechanists suggest that parts have properties that are relatively stable over time and that
at least theoretically these parts are subject to manipulation and isolation from the rest
of   the   mechanism.” While parts are taken to be real things as opposed to explanatory
constructs, the New Mechanists agree that there is an inherent perspectivalism in the
process of identifying and individuating parts: mechanisms are always mechanisms for
some phenomenon or behaviour (Glennan 1996, Darden 2008, Craver 2013). A single
system that exhibits a variety of behaviors may be decomposed in different ways
depending upon what mechanism-dependent phenomena one begins with. For instance,
if the phenomenon in question is range of motion of primate limbs, parts would include
such things as bones, muscles and ligaments. If on the other hand, the phenomenon in
question concerns coordination and control of limbs, there would be a different division
– including, for instance, sensory and motor neurons, parts whose boundaries cross-cut
the boundaries of the parts upon which range-of-motion phenomena depend. This is in
part an explanatory point, but the New Mechanists accept a broadly realist account of
explanation in which these decompositions are explanatory because they refer to real
features of the world.
A second feature of the New Mechanist consensus is the idea that phenomena
exhibited by the mechanisms are produced by the activities and interactions of parts.
The   terms   ‘activity’,   ‘interaction’, and   ‘produce’   are   all   transparently causal. If the
activities and interactions are not genuinely causal, then mechanism   can’t   produce  
anything. Mechanistic explanation is a species of causal explanation and the legitimacy
of mechanistic explanation depends upon the interactions between parts being genuinely
causal.
It appears at first glance that there are serious substantive disagreements among the
mechanists about just what activities and interactions are. Much of this appearance is
due to the Machamer et al 2000, which frames its characterization of mechanisms in
opposition to the earlier views of Glennan (1996). Machamer, Darden and Craver
characterized  their  ontological  position  as  “dualist”  as  opposed  to the views of Glennan
and Bechtel and Richardson, which they describe   as   “substantivalist.”      Their view is
supposedly dualist because they say that mechanisms consist of entities and activities,
and that neither category is reducible to the other.
3

Although Machamer et al 2000 makes a number of important points about the
ontology   of   mechanisms,   we   believe   the   term   ‘dualism’   is   misleading. It overstates
ontological disagreements with Glennan and Bechtel and suggests an unnecessarily
spooky view of activities that is not developed in subsequent work. The sense in which
their position is dualistic is simply in insisting that any proper characterization of a
mechanism will make reference not just to the parts of that mechanism, but also to the
activities (and interactions) of those parts. But this is something that Glennan and
Bechtel certainly agree with. Moreover, the term ‘dualism’ suggests an independence
of entities and activities that is implausible. Activities always require actors, and there
are no entities which   don’t   (or   at   least   can’t)   engage   in   activities. Perhaps the most
obvious   difference   between   the   terms   ‘activity’   and   ‘interaction’ concerns the arity of
the relation (Illari & Williamson 2012). An interaction always involves more than one
entity or part,   while   the   term   ‘activity’   is   inclusive   of   both   interactions   and   solo  
activities.3
The New Mechanists embrace an approach to causality that falls within the family
of   approaches   that   Woodward   (2011)   has   characterized   as   “geometrical-mechanical”  
accounts. These accounts, which also include the causal-mechanical approach to causal
processes that has been advocated by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe, suggest that
genuine causality is an intrinsic relation that depends upon singular connections via
continuous processes. They are contrasted with what Woodward (and many others) call
difference-making accounts, which understand causality as an extrinsic and comparative
relation in which counterfactual dependence (or perhaps other sorts of comparative
relations) rather than productive connection is essential.4 The New Mechanist approach
diverges from the Salmon/Dowe approach to productivity in its causal pluralism.
Rather than seeking a reductive analysis in terms of some physical characteristic (like
exchange of conserved quantities) the New Mechanists argue that there are many sorts
of causes, corresponding to different sorts of activities and interactions, which produce
different kinds of changes in different kinds of entities. For instance kinds of activities
and interactions that occur in ecological systems (e.g., trophic interactions between
plants and animals like predation and grazing) are very different than those that occur in
biochemical systems (e.g., unwinding and transcription of DNA or folding of proteins).
A third feature of the New Mechanist consensus is its focus on organization. It
is the organization of the entities (and their activities) that allows the mechanism to
produce the phenomenon that it does. A pile of lawnmower parts does not a
lawnmower make. While mechanists emphasize the importance of spatial and temporal
organization, it is ultimately the causal organization upon which the productive
capacities of the mechanism depend.

3

We concur with Tabery (2004) that all mechanisms require that at least some of their activities be
interactive. See Machamer (2004), Darden (2008), and Glennan (2010) for further discussion of this
point.
4
A notable exception here appears to be Craver (2007). Principally because of concerns about
causal relevance the problem of causation by disconnection, Craver retreated from the MDC approach to
activities and adopted significant parts of Woodward’s  difference  making  approach  to  causality.    While  it  
is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  to  argue  for  it,  our  view  is  that  Craver’s  retreat  does  not  sit  well  with  
other of his commitments – most notably to a picture of etiological causal explanations that looks very
much  like  Salmon’s.
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To clarify the role or organization in mechanisms, consider as a brief example the
mechanism for starting a lawnmower engine. The engine is started by rapidly pulling a
cord while the throttle is set to an appropriate level. The cord is attached to a flywheel
which in turn engages a clutch which causes the crank shaft to move, which in turn
moves the piston, allowing air and fuel into the cylinder. The flywheel is also connected
to a magneto – a device which uses the rotation of magnets to generate a voltage. The
magneto is attached to the sparkplug which produces the spark that ignites the fuel-air
mixture in the piston. The production of the phenomenon (namely the starting of the
mower) depends essentially on organization. The parts must be spatially organized so
that the same part – the flywheel – may simultaneously engage the clutch and turn the
magneto. Timing is also essential here. The parts must be so organized that the spark
generated by the spark plug  enters  the  cylinder  at  the  correct  time  in  the  piston’s  cycle.
These spatial and temporal arrangements determine the causal organization of the
system.
An important consequence of the New Mechanist view of causal organization is a
certain kind of anti-holism. Typically it is not the case that every part of a mechanism is
causally connected to every other part. And in many cases of causal dependence, the
connecting process will be indirect. For instance, in the lawn mower, the pulling the
cord may produce a movement of the piston – but not directly. It operates via a chain of
more direct interactions of the intervening parts.
A fourth feature of the New Mechanist approach is its focus on the hierarchical
organization of mechanisms. Mechanisms and the phenomena they produce may in turn
be embedded in larger mechanisms, and the parts of mechanisms and their activities and
interactions may be explained in terms of the operations of lower-level mechanisms.
This idea is schematically represented in diagrams such as the one found in figure 1
(redrawn from Glennan 2011).
b
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Figure 1: Hierarchical Arrangement of Mechanisms

Glennan emphasizes that the activities and interactions of the parts of mechanisms are
“mechanically  explicable”  – meaning that what is, at one level of the hierarchy, a direct
interaction between parts, will be explained as the operation of a complex mechanism at
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a lower level. In this diagram, the upper level circles and arrows represent higher-level
entities and interactions, while the lower level circles represent lower level ones.5
An obvious question raised by this hierarchical organization, is if, when and how
the hierarchy bottoms out. Machamer et al (2000) emphasized that mechanistic
explanations  start  from  “bottom-out”  entities  and  activities.     Machamer et al emphasize
that   “bottoming   out   is   relative”   (ibid, 13). Within different fields or research groups,
different activities will be taken as unproblematic and basic. This is an important
methodological observation, but it does not answer the metaphysical question of
whether or not there are entities and activities that form an absolute bottom.
Metaphysically we may identify a couple of possibilities. One is a metaphysical
atomism in which there is a set of basic objects – the atoms – that interact with each
other, perhaps in a manner that is law-governed, but which is at any rate not explicable
by further mechanisms. This position, often called microphysicalism (Pettit 1993), has
its defenders in the metaphysics community, but we take it that our current best physics
raises serious doubts about microphysicalism (Schaffer 2003; Ladyman and Ross 2007).
Another possibility is that there are mechanisms all the way down; there is no
fundamental level and every interaction is mechanically explicable.
While we concur with Schaffer that there are not compelling scientific or
metaphysical arguments for a fundamental level, the mechanisms-all-the-way-down
approach does pose challenges for the ontological views of the New Mechanists. The
problem is not that the New Mechanists are committed to microphysicalism; it is rather
that one cannot assume that all levels will have the ontological features required to
provide mechanistic explanations of higher level entities and activities. Even if there is
no absolute bottom, there may be some level below which there are no classical
mechanisms. We will call this level the fundamental classical level.
After a review of some important features of quantum mechanics, we will argue for
two claims about the relationship between the New Mechanicism and the ontological
consequences of quantum mechanics. First, we shall show how the theory of quantum
decoherence can explain the emergence of a fundamental classical level. Second, we
will show that, by relaxing certain assumptions, we can find within the quantum realm
non-classical phenomena that can be explained mechanistically.

5
A referee has suggested that this hierarchical picture seems to commit the New Mechanists to a
view that gives ontological priority to parts over wholes in the sense discussed by, e.g., Morganti (2009)
and Schaffer (2010). It is true that the New Mechanists hold that the causal powers (or activities) of
wholes depend upon those of their parts, and this would seem to give ontological priority to their parts.
But at the same time, as noted above, the  New  Mechanists’  are  committed  to  perspectivalism  about  partdecomposition that is holistic: what the parts are cannot be answered independently of an account of what
the mechanism as a whole is doing. (This kind of holism is not inconsistent with the aforementioned antiholism according to which it is not the case that every part is connected to every other part.)
We expect that the best way to cash out claims about the ontological priority of mechanisms versus their
parts might be by looking at patterns of temporal order and causal dependence – and here the answers
might not be univocal. For instance, one might argue that the parts of the lawnmower are ontologically
prior to the lawnmower as a whole, because the parts pre-exist the lawnmower. Contrast this with the
case of a living system (like a chipmunk) and its parts (like its muscles or veins). In the latter case the
parts do not pre-exist the whole, and they cannot survive and maintain their identity except in the context
of the whole.
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2

Potential Clashes between the New Mechanicism and Quantum
Mechanics

Let us draw together the key features of the mechanist consensus in order to
identify the ontological suppositions of the New Mechanists and the potential conflicts
that these ontological commitments have with ontological commitments that may be
forced upon us by quantum mechanics:
1. The New Mechanists believe that the world is composed of a variety of objects;
many objects are compounded from smaller objects; there may or may not be
some basic objects of which all other objects are made. Either way, in asserting
that these objects (both the basic and the compound) are really objects, the New
Mechanists suppose that these objects can be characterized by some set of
properties that exist in the objects regardless of whether they are observed or
measured.
2. The New Mechanists believe that there are causal relations that obtain between
these objects, basic or compound. Higher level causal relations obtain in virtue
of causal relations between parts of intervening mechanisms. If there are any
basic objects, there must be fundamental (non-mechanism-dependent) causal
relations that obtain between them.
3. The New Mechanists believe that causal interactions between the parts of a
mechanism are intrinsic and local. It is not the case that every part of the
mechanism is connected to every other part. Given a decomposition of
mechanisms into parts, one can distinguish some causal influences that involve
direct connection between parts, while other causal influences obtain via
intermediate entities and activities.
There are at least three non-classical features in quantum mechanics that seem to clash
with the ontological commitments of the New Mechanists6:
(A) Indeterminacy of properties
(B)

Non-localizability of quantum objects

(C)

Non-separability of quantum  states  due  to  entanglement  (“quantum  holism”)

In this section we will explain briefly how these features of quantum mechanical
systems arise, and where they appear to conflict with the ontological approach of the
New Mechanists.
From an ontological point of view the most initially disconcerting feature of
quantum mechanics is arguably the (A) indeterminacy of properties. In general, QM
only predicts probabilities for finding certain values of observable quantities upon
measurement (e.g. position, momentum, spin). The issue is not that properties are fuzzy
or unsharp. In the most extreme case, nothing at all can be said, i.e. there is not even an
increased probability for finding a value in any given finite interval. A classic
expression of this indeterminacy is Heisenberg’s   uncertainty   principle. According to
this principle,  upon  precise  measurement  of,  say,  an  electron’s  position,  its momentum
6

The picture changes if one adopts one of the rival interpretations or revisions of quantum
mechanics such as a many-worlds interpretation or the Bohmian approach. However, this would make the
discussion far more complex and would distract from our main line of reasoning.
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becomes completely uncertain,  and  conversely  a  precise  measurement  of  the  electron’s  
momentum makes the position uncertain. Thus  Heisenberg’s  uncertainty  principle tells
us that it is impossible to simultaneously ascribe a sharp position and a sharp
momentum to an electron, even though we can measure either its position or its
momentum precisely, or both successively. More generally, it is impossible to
simultaneously ascribe sharp values to all measurable properties of quantum objects.
The apparent conflict between the mechanist program and the indeterminacy of
properties arises from the fact that the phenomena produced by mechanisms are thought
to be produced by the interaction of parts in virtue of their dynamically relevant
properties. If it is impossible to even ascribe these properties  to  the  mechanism’s  parts  
then the mechanistic program comes to a grinding halt in its very first step, namely the
decomposition into interacting parts.
Problem (B), the non-localizability of quantum objects, is in one sense just a
particular instance of the indeterminacy of properties, in this case concerning the
position observable. However, non-localizability has features that merit additional
attention. If at a given time t0 the wave function of some quantum object is localized in
a finite region it will develop, due to the dynamical law of quantum mechanics, infinite
tails immediately after t0. In other words, the wave function will instantaneously spread
over the entire space (Hegerfeldt 1998). This happens in non-relativistic quantum
mechanics already but there it is not a problem because nothing forbids infinitely high
velocities. At least it makes sense to assume that a quantum object is localized in a finite
interval at some given time. However, if one respects the requirements of special
relativity theory, localizability gets lost in a more drastic way: The very concept of a
localized  object  doesn’t  fit  into  the  resulting theory any more.7
Specifically concerning mechanisms, two problems arise. The first problem is that
non-localizability implies that multiple quantum   objects   “occupy”   the   same   infinite  
space-time region. This obviously and unsurprisingly applies to light quanta. However,
it also applies to quantum objects with (rest) mass, such as electrons. Thus apparently
the most basic components are no longer spatiotemporally distinct objects as initially
intended by the mechanistic program. Secondly, if quantum objects are spread out in the
entire universe, then it  seems  that  they  don’t  qualify  as  those  entities  that  interact  locally
in mechanisms.
The third and final problem (C) concerns the non-separability of quantum states
due to entanglement, also called quantum holism (Healey 2009). While the first two
problems apply to single quantum objects already, non-separability applies only to
composite systems.8 In general, quantum objects are entangled with each other. This
means that complete possible knowledge about the states of the subsystems does not
imply complete knowledge about the compound state. The reason for the entanglement
of quantum objects are radically non-classical laws for their composition: The features
of the composition are intrinsic properties of the compound system, which are not
7

See Halvorson and Clifton (2002) and Kuhlmann (2010: sec. 8.3; 2012: sec. 5).
In fact, (A) and (C), too, are intimately connected, because in order to spell out (A) one eventually
has to deal with the compound state of some quantum object and a measurement apparatus, which
become entangled through the measurement interaction. Nevertheless, metaphysically (A) and (C) focus
on two distinct issues. Whereas (A) concerns the ascription of properties to single quantum objects, (C)
focuses on the question how composite quantum systems relate to their parts.
8
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captured by specifying all spatiotemporal properties of the separate subsystems. Thus
non-separability – or quantum holism – may undermine the very conception of separate
parts, which is indispensable for the mechanistic program. But there is also another
point where quantum entanglement seems to clash with new mechanicism: Even the
most complete information about the spatiotemporal organization of  the  system’s  parts  
does not determine the behavior of the whole system, thereby calling the key idea of
mechanisms into question.
Note that the issue of the non-determinateness of properties differs from nonseparability of states. In a sense, the latter is worse than the former. While the nondeterminateness of properties may be dealt with in terms of probabilistic dispositions or
‘propensities’  (Suárez  2007), non-separability of states poses a still more serious threat
to the applicability of the mechanistic conception in the quantum realm because it seems
to prohibit the separate ascription of properties – be these determinate or only
dispositional – to different parts of a compound system. Due  to  ‘quantum  holism’ one
cannot say everything relevant about one given quantum object without having to say
something about other quantum objects, too, and this applies not just to their mutual
spatiotemporal relation. One may claim (Hüttemann 2005) that we are here dealing with
a strong form of emergence because why a given compound system is in a certain
superposition of entangled subsystems cannot be explained in terms of the states of its
subsystems: The entangled parts of a compound system that is in a determinate state,
namely a superposition, can no longer themselves be in determinate states (they are in
so-called   “mixed   states”).9 Apparently this undermines the idea of explaining the
behavior   of   a   system   mechanistically,   because   there   don’t   seem   to   be   any   separately
describable parts below the level of the whole system.

3

Decoherence and the Emergence of Classical Phenomena

In the famous Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, commonly seen to be
primarily built on the ideas of Niels Bohr10, there is a sharp divide between
(microscopic) quantum objects and macroscopic measurement apparatuses: In order to
describe the quantum world it is indispensable to refer to classical measurement
apparatuses. Since measurement apparatuses thus differ fundamentally from quantum
objects, it is impossible to understand what happens in a measurement. In loose
connection with the Copenhagen interpretation it is then often said that measurement
apparatuses can record determinate measurement outcomes because they are
macroscopic. However, when we want to know a bit more about what is going on, this
view turns out to be very unsatisfactory: First, where does the microscopic world end
and our macroscopic world begin? In principle, quantum mechanics seems to be
universally valid and govern our everyday world just as much as it governs the micro
world. Second, if we make the natural assumption that macroscopic objects are
themselves made up of microscopic quantum constituents, it is completely unclear why
9
As Hüttemann (2005) argues, “synchronic microexplanations”   fail   in   the   realm   of   quantum  
physics. Although   Hüttemann’s   focus   differs   from   that   of   the   present   investigation,   his   arguments   are  
nevertheless relevant with some suitable adjustments.
10
See Scheibe (1973, ch. 1) for a very accurate   account   of   Bohr’s   ideas.There   is   considerable  
dispute  about  what  exactly  “the  Copenhagen interpretation”  is  and  how  it  relates  to  Bohr’s  views.  Howard  
(2002)   argues   that   “the   Copenhagen interpretation”   was   an   invention   by   Heisenberg   in   the   mid-1950s.
Interestingly,   Howard   thinks   that   Bohr’s   complementarity interpretation is even close to decoherence
theory (private communication). However, that is a very non-standard reading of Bohr.
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there should be a fundamental physical divide between the quantum and the classical
world in the first place. The postulate that measurement apparatuses must be described
in a classical way even seems to forbid asking for the physical processes that take place
when a quantum system interacts with a measurement apparatus to produce the
determinate measurement outcomes we observe.
Von Neumann (1932) broke sharply with this non-intelligibility dictum by offering
a detailed account of the quantum measurement process. His account treats all relevant
parts, including the measurement apparatus, as quantum systems. Virtually every
modern treatment follows von Neumann’s account in many respects. However, while
von   Neumann’s   descriptive   analysis,   terminology   and   general   approach   were   a   great  
break-through, in the end he primarily achieved a very lucid formulation of the basic
problems, but not their solution. So it remained unclear whether it is appropriate to treat
macroscopic objects as quantum systems, in particular given that they very often appear
classical.
In recent decades many experiments and industrial techniques have shown that
quantum phenomena are not restricted to the microscopic level. And even in cosmology
quantum physics is indispensable. Nevertheless, in our midsized everyday world and
also in most scientific contexts, the peculiarities of quantum mechanics are surprisingly
absent.11 These facts make it ever harder to explicate the quantum/classical boundary
using a distinction between the microscopic and the macroscopic.
The theory of decoherence provides a precise and explicit analysis of this
boundary, following von Neumann in spirit. Its goal is to explain how classical behavior
emerges in a world that is completely governed by the laws of quantum mechanics. In
other words, decoherence attempts to explain why objects that are ultimately made up of
quantum mechanical constituents very often behave classically. As we will see,
decoherence shows which processes contribute to the suppression of quantum effects in
macroscopic systems. However, in all of the following one has to be aware that
decoherence only supplies partial and approximate answers. They are partial because
they have to be combined with further considerations or particular interpretations of
quantum mechanics. And the answers of decoherence are approximate in the sense that
quantum effects never disappear completely.
3.1

Non-Classical Phenomena

In section 2, we introduced those non-classical features of quantum phenomena that
appear to pose problems for the New Mechanist. To explain how decoherence theory
might explain away these problems, it will be helpful to focus on a famous QM
experiment that manifests these phenomena – the double-slit experiment.
Since the fundamental dynamical law of QM, the Schrödinger equation, is linear,
the sum of any two solutions is also a solution and thus represents a possible state of
affairs. The superposition principle in itself is well-known from classical physics:
water, sound or electromagnetic waves are also described by linear wave equations, and
can therefore be added together, sometimes producing interference effects. In the
double-slit experiment, we appear to observe the same phenomenon. Light passing
through two parallel slits projects onto a screen, and we see an interference pattern that
11

Since there is no need to distinguish (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics, (relativistic) quantum
field theory and other parts of quantum physics, we will often use the most well-known  term  ‘quantum  
mechanics’  in  a  comprehensive  way,  as  it  is  quite  common  among  physicists,  too.
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seems to arise from the classical superposition of two waves, one originating from the
upper slit and one from the lower slit.
On closer scrutiny something odd happens, which is most clearly apparent when
we perform the double-slit experiment with an electron beam. It is possible to lower the
rate of electrons in the beam so much that only one electron at a time passes through the
double-slit.12 We know this, because we detect dot-like hits of single electrons on the
screen. At first these dots seem to be random but after a while we see a pattern forming,
namely the same kind of interference pattern of multiple bright and dark bands that we
get for classical waves passing through a double-slit – the notorious wave-particle
duality.
How do these individual electrons collectively form the interference pattern? One
could imagine that it is different electrons, some passing through the upper and some
passing through the lower slit, whose effects are superposed and lead to the interference.
However, this cannot be the case because we know that we get the interference pattern
even if we make sure that only one electron passes through the double-slit at a time.
Hence the superposition of whatever goes through the upper and the lower slit must
refer to a single electron already. Thus after an electron has passed through the doubleslit we have a so-called  “coherent  superposition”  of  two  states that classically exclude
each other, namely first, for the electron having gone through the upper slit and, second,
for it having gone through the lower slit (Schlosshauer 2007, sec. 2.2.)
The peculiarities of wave-particle duality might be tolerated for small quantum
objects like electrons, but the same effects can occur on larger scales. Wave-particle
duality has been experimentally demonstrated in the behavior of buckyballs—large,
cage-like carbon C60 molecules (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Interference pattern produced by Buckyball molecules (Adapted from Nairz et al. 2003. Need to
ask for permission from American Journal of Physics!)

It seems that something as large as a C60 molecule must be well localized in any
context. And in fact, it is hard to realize experimental arrangements in which we see
wave-like effects for large objects. But it is possible, and nothing prevents interference
effects from occurring not only with electrons and buckyballs, but also with

12

See Tonomura et al. 1989.
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macroscopic objects. The superposition principle of quantum mechanics allows for
highly non-classical states on any scale (e.g.  for  Schrödinger’s  cat).
Mathematically speaking, the quantum mechanical superposition principle says that
any linear combination of states, i.e. essentially any sum of states, is also a state.
Ontologically  speaking,  this  means  that  a  superposition  is  on  a  par  with  its  “component  
states”13 (the summands in the linear combination), i.e. the superposed states.
Superpositions are strikingly non-classical because mutually exclusive classical states
are ascribed to one  and  the  same  “object”, and interfere with each other as if there were
different interacting objects. Saying that a superposition is coherent then means that the
component states, which are added up, all refer to one object and not to an ensemble of
objects.
The presence of superpositions is at the core of the most severe conceptual problem
of quantum mechanics, the quantum measurement problem: On the one hand, quantum
mechanics tells us that a superposition can arise when a quantum object interacts with a
measurement apparatus and remains a superposition for all times—according to the one
and only dynamical law of quantum mechanics, the Schrödinger equation. On the other
hand, the measurement results we actually find, particular pointer positions, and which
quantum mechanics predicts to occur with certain probabilities, are determinate
outcomes. This is a formidable conflict because the Schrödinger equation never brings
us from superpositions to determinate measurement outcomes. There appears to be an
acute need for such a second kind of dynamics, the so-called collapse of the wave
function.
In order to appreciate the paramount significance of the measurement problem, it is
important to realize that this is not a problem concerning measurements per se. It is
about the ubiquitous manifestation of determinate properties, which the basic dynamical
law  of  quantum  mechanics,  the  Schrödinger  equation,  doesn’t  seem  to  allow.  While the
problem can be described in terms of laboratory measurements, wave collapse (via
“quantum  measurements”)  happens everywhere and all the time. Only a tiny fraction of
these events take place in a lab. According to the Schrödinger equation, any object – be
it microscopic or macroscopic – that interacts in a suitable way with a quantum object in
some superposition should itself be in a non-classical superposition for all future times.
However, this is not what we observe.
3.2

Decoherence as an Explanation of the Emergence of Classical Phenomena

The fact that superpositions and the resulting interference effects are so hard to realize
and detect even for objects the size of C60 molecules, which are still much smaller than,
say, cats, indicates that something seems to be going on that is ever more difficult to
avert as objects get larger. This something is called decoherence.14 It is almost
ubiquitous in macro-realms because the larger an object is the more it tends to interact
with its environment. When it does, it gets entangled with so many other close and
remote things that there is no longer any way to locally detect a quantum superposition
13

Note that this common talk is somewhat misleading because superpositions do not actually
consist of  the  superposed  states.  Any  basis  change  leads  to  a  different  set  of  “component  states”.
14
See Bacciagaluppi 2012, Joos et al. 2003, Schlosshauer 2007, Zurek 1981, 1982, 1991, 2002 und
2003 und Wallace forthcoming.
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and the resulting interference effects. The crucial point is that the superposition gets
delocalized into the environment so that the coherence of the superposition decreases
and eventually almost disappears.15 Accordingly, the characteristic quantum mechanical
interference effects are suppressed due to interactions between the respective system
and its macroscopic environment. Thus coherence is  a  measure  of  the  “quantumness”  of  
a physical system and decoherence is the process by which this quantumness effectively
disappears.
Let us describe more closely the phenomenon of decoherence. If electrons
travelling through the double slit were classical objects, then they would produce two
peaks on the screen behind the slits; but they instead produce the non-classical
interference pattern. Moreover, this pattern cannot be explained as representing our
ignorance about the electron trajectories, since the classical alternatives (going through
one or the other slit) interfere with each other for one and the same object. As we have
seen in section 3.1, such a non-classical superposition of classical alternatives can be
amplified up to any scale.
It is helpful to describe a superposition mathematically in terms of a so-called
density matrix. Figure 3 contains a graphical representation of the density matrix for a
“Schrödinger cat state”   (Zurek   2002),   i.e.   a   non-classical superposition of classical
alternatives. The two peaks on the left and right side graphically represent the offdiagonal elements of the density matrix, which are responsible for the non-classical
interference effects. Usually we don’t  observe  any such effects on macroscopic scales.
But why is that so? The standard formalism of quantum mechanics seems to give us no
reason to expect that the off-diagonal elements, and thereby the non-classical
interference effects, should disappear on any scale. In particular, it seems that
measurement devices should inherit the interference behavior from the quantum objects
they are designed to measure. Quantum mechanics tells us that they become entangled
with the quantum objects to be measured and just form bigger superpositions, so that we
get the same problem again on a higher scale.
Decoherence   theory   provides   a   plausible   explanation   of   why   we   don’t   see   such  
superpositions. In essence, decoherence theory suggests that in most situations, quantum
entanglement is spread into the environment, making non-classical superpositions
locally unobservable. Formally, the idea is to extend the so-called von Neumann chain
S + A of system S and measurement apparatus A to include environment E, so that we
get the bigger system S + A + E, and to then abstract from the environment again.16 This
is no formal trick. Rather, the point is that our puzzlement over the rarity of
macroscopically entangled states arises from an insufficient application of the quantum
formalism. The extension of the von Neumann chain is motivated by the realization that
the system S + A, like most physical systems in nature, is hardly ever isolated, but an
open system, which interacts more or less intensely with its environment E.
15
In the course of a decoherence process quantum states effectively lose their (quantum) coherence.
The coherence that is removed by decoherence is the one present in coherent superpositions, where the
adjective ‘coherent’   is   usually   dropped   and   one   simply   talks   about   ‘superpositions’.   Note   that   the   term  
‘decoherence’   was   introduced   only   in   the   late   1980s.   This   now   well-established term may be a bit
unfortunate because coherence sounds like a desirable property, which classical objects in particular do
have.   Also   note   that   the   term   ‘decoherence’   may   refer   either   to   the   process   of   decoherence   and   or   the  
theory of decoherence.
16
Schlosshauer 2007, ch. 1 and sec. 9.2, has a concise non-technical discussion of this procedure.
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The second step, abstracting from the environment again, is again a formal step
with a solid physical interpretation.17 Here, too, the crucial point consists in appreciating
the consequences of an obvious fact: what we actually deal with, as scientists as well as
in our everyday lives, is not the universe as a whole with all of the interconnections of
its constituents; what we actually deal with is a small number of features of local states
of affairs. Thus, although in principle quantum systems interact with the whole universe
and build up infinitely many entanglements, what we observe and measure is only a tiny
fraction of this system. Nonetheless, it is due to this interaction that the interference/
entanglement/ coherence present in a local system S + A gets irreversibly delocalized
into the environment E. The Schrödinger dynamics, according to which a superposition
always stays a superposition, thus appears to be broken – provided we restrict our
perspective to S + A. The system S + A appears disentangled although, and in fact
because, it is entangled with its entire environment. Thus this second step consists in
deliberately dispensing with information that is effectively no longer available to us.18
Ideally, the establishment of an entanglement with the environment has the effect that
the density matrix of S + A has no off-diagonal terms, which represent the troublesome
interference between classical alternatives.19 In   practice   the   interference   terms   don’t  
vanish completely but just become very small (see figure 3). The degree to which the
interference terms disappear is a measure for how well the system “decoheres”.20

17

Note that the “environment”  is  not  necessarily  something  outside  of  the  measurement  apparatus.  
“Environment”   can   also   refer   to   macroscopic   internal   degrees   of   freedom   besides   those   which   are  
explicitly responsible for the measurement.
18
Technically speaking, the interaction with the environment has the effect that S + A is no longer
in a (pure) state, whereas the superposition, in which S + A + E is, is a pure state. If we are interested in
S + A alone, we need to calculate the so-called  “reduced  state”  of S + A by removing all the information
that refers to the environment. The reduced state of S + A encodes only the local measurement statistics
for S + A, and no measurement statistics referring to correlations between S + A and the environment E.
19
But note that even if the off-diagonal terms vanish completely, an ignorance interpretation is not
allowed, since this would presuppose a classical ensemble of alternatives.
20
This is in turn determined by how effectively the environment can unambiguously detect the state
of the system. One point is that the environment must have at least as many different states as the system
under observation; another one is that these environment states must have little, or ideally: no, overlap.
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Figure 3: Evolution of the density matrix for the Schrödinger cat state (Reprinted from Zurek 2002). The
smaller the melted peaks on the right side are (representing the off-diagonal elements), the
better the system decoheres.

4

Decoherence and the Grounding of the New Mechanicism

In section 2 of this paper we identified three apparent threats posed by the non-classical
features of quantum mechanics, namely (A) indeterminacy of properties, (B) nonlocalizability of quantum objects, and (C) non-separability of quantum states due to
entanglement. In this section, we will show how, in light of our discussion of
decoherence and of the local character of mechanistic explanation, these features do not
in fact threaten the mechanistic program in the ways we might have supposed.
Threat (A) says that since quantum objects – and thereby all objects – fail to
possess definite values for dynamically relevant properties (in particular position and
momentum), mechanistic decomposition into locally interacting parts is not possible. As
we saw in the last section the basic reason for this quantum mechanical indeterminacy
of properties is that, with respect to most observables, quantum objects are in
superpositions of different values and these superpositions never disappear through any
interaction that is described by the Schrödinger equation. But we also learnt that due to
decoherence these superpositions are effectively invisible for most real systems that
interact with their environment. Thus decoherence shows that threat (A) is much less
acute in most cases where we want to give mechanistic explanations.
In one sense, as we noted in section 2, non-localizability (B) is just the problem of
the indeterminacy (A) of one particularly important property, spatial position.
However, given the special importance of position in many mechanistic explanations,
and in particular the inconsistency between the quantum-mechanical indeterminacy of
position and the special relativistic requirement of causality, more needs to be said
about (B). Fortunately, it turns out that beyond the general reasons regarding
indeterminacy of properties, the theory of decoherence indicates that there are special
reasons that explain why position behaves more classically than other observables. The
problem we don’t have with the position observable is most intuitively visible when we
formulate it regarding the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics: In its
strongest version it says that for each measurement-like interaction we have a branching
15

into a multitude of coexisting worlds—thus   no   “collapse   of   the   wave   function”.
However, the formalism of QM allows decomposing a given quantum state in many
different  incompatible  ways.  So  the  standard  quantum  measurement  theory  doesn’t  tell  
us with respect to which observable the branching into parallel worlds occurs—a
formidable problem. Decoherence yields the solution: it is not the case that all
observables are on a par. The interaction with the environment is often such that one
observable is effectively selected.21 In most cases the so-called  “preferred  pointer  basis”  
happens to be the one of the position observable. There is no general law why it should
be  that  way,  but  that’s  the  result  of  many  concrete  calculations  for  particular  examples  
of decoherence processes. That the preferred pointer basis refers to position means that
it is this property in particular that behaves classically—again only from a local
perspective of course. This means that locally macroscopic objects are typically not in
superpositions of different positions.
Finally, decoherence also substantially attenuates threat (C)—the non-separability
of quantum states due to entanglement. In principle entanglement is omnipresent, and it
can in fact be detected even in large macroscopic objects such as the particle accelerator
in CERN, which has a circumference of almost 27 kilometers. However, because of
environment-induced decoherence, quantum entanglement is hardly ever visible on such
macroscopic scales. One can only sustain detectable large-scale quantum entanglements
if one has a system as   super   “clean”   and   shielded   from environmental interactions as
one finds in a particle accelerator in a tunnel 175 meters beneath the ground. Thus,
because of decoherence, quantum entanglement usually plays no role on scales where
mechanistic explanations start.
In our exposition of the decoherence program, we have emphasized that the theory
of decoherence explains why the world we observe appears to be approximately
classical in local contexts and at macroscopic scales. We should couple this observation
with an explicit reminder that decoherence theory does not (by itself at least) solve the
measurement problem or other conceptual problems in quantum mechanics.22 But these
are not the problems we seek to solve. For our purposes, the main significance of
decoherence lies not in its contribution to the foundations of quantum mechanics, but in
the explanation it gives of why and to what extent it is legitimate to treat the many
things in the world around us in a classical way.
The value of the decoherence program depends upon whether one is concerned
with local or global questions. While decoherence alone is insufficient for global
interpretive matters, it is very helpful for questions viewed from a local perspective. By
a local perspective, we mean any physical situation where a given system can be
distinguished from its larger environment. A local perspective can be taken towards
systems of any size.23 We can ask local questions even about very large systems like
galaxies, since these can still be distinguished from their global environment within the
universe. In contexts that are local in this sense, decoherence helps to explain why
21

Mathematically, this is represented by the suppression of off-diagonal elements in the reduced
density matrix of S + A.
22
Ultimately we need something more, either a particular interpretation or possibly a combination
of decoherence with a different approach (see Landsman 2007).
23
Note that this notion of locality differs from the one familiar in the philosophy of quantum
mechanics, which refers to the causal separation of space-like related events.
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systems whose constituents are ultimately subject to the laws of quantum mechanics
behave approximately classically. This legitimates classical mechanistic explanations of
the behavior of such systems. Moreover, it does so in a way that is largely independent
of any particular interpretation of quantum mechanics.24
One way of understanding what is required for the mechanistic approach is to
say that there must be some fundamental classical level, a bottom-out level of
classically behaving entities that can be used to ground mechanistic explanations of
higher-level phenomena. The decoherence account provides us with an account of how
this fundamental classical level emerges, but an important consequence of this account
is that it shows that and why this level is not a uniform one. The fundamental classical
level is not absolute but depends on the specific circumstances. We can have quasiclassical objects on the level of molecules, as in nano-technology, and we can also have
detectable quantum phenomena on macroscopic scales (e.g., superconductivity, laser
light, EPR correlations over large distances at CERN). What decoherence tells us is
that it is not size per se that matters for the emergence of apparent classicality, but the
kinds and quantities of interactions between a system and its environment.
The non-uniformity of the classical boundary fits well with the ontological
presuppositions of the neo-mechanistic approach. The mechanistic approach starts from
the assumption that mechanisms are local (Glennan 2011; McKay Illari and Williamson
2011), which is to say that the causal powers and behaviors of mechanisms arise from
the arrangement and interactions of particular parts situated at a particular location in
space and time. There is no need to appeal to some single set of universally valid laws
to account for these interactions. The mechanistic approach, like the decoherence
approach, shows how to explain the behavior of particular systems located within
particular environments.

5

Non-Classical Mechanisms within Quantum Mechanics

Our strategy in this paper has, to this point, been largely defensive. We have argued that
decoherence provides a useful explanation of why, in particular local circumstances,
systems behave classically in spite of their being ultimately constituted of entities that
obey the principles of quantum mechanics, and that this explanation deflects possible
concerns over the ontological and explanatory legitimacy of the mechanistic approach.
However, it is not the case that all systems behave classically, and in particular
there are some systems whose macroscopic-scale behavior depends essentially on nonclassical features of the parts that constitute them. Familiar examples are
superconductors25 and lasers, but nanotechnological26 and even some biological systems

24

Moreover, in most, if not all, of the extant proposals for an interpretation (or modification) of
quantum mechanics, classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are at least less in conflict from the
very start. For instance, in the many worlds interpretation within each of the many worlds all objects have
definite properties. And in Bohmian quantum mechanics, the position is classical, and thus localized,
from  the  very  start;;  it  is  only  unobservable  (a  “hidden  variable”).  However,  like  quantum  mechanics,  yet  
in  a  more  drastic  way,  Bohmian  mechanics  is  a  “non-local”  theory,  e.g.  even  space-like separated objects
can influence each other.
25
See Hartmann (2008) for a philosophical discussion.
26
See Band and Avishai (2013, sec. 1.2, ch. 11, 13, 15).
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belong in this group.27 Are such systems mechanistically explicable? – Yes and no. It is
clear that traditional mechanistic explanation depends upon assumptions that the parts
and interactions involved in the production of phenomena are classical – and so
classical mechanistic strategies cannot be used to explain such phenomena. On the other
hand, we think that there are important similarities between classical mechanistic
explanations and certain varieties of explanations for the behavior of genuinely quantum
mechanical systems. Such explanations describe what we might naturally call nonclassical mechanisms. In this section we will briefly consider what such explanations
look like, comparing classical and non-classical mechanistic explanations.
In this paper we have identified three non-classical features of quantum mechanics:
(A) indeterminacy of properties, (B) non-localizability of objects, and (C) nonseparability of states. Our conclusion to this point has been that decoherence explains
why  we  don’t  typically  see  these  features in classical mechanistic systems. But now let
us consider the sense in which we can offer mechanistic explanations when these
features do pertain. Our view briefly is this: While the quantum mechanical
indeterminateness of properties (A) is a serious problem for fundamental ontology, it is
usually not a concern for scientific explanations. When it comes to potentially
mechanistic explanations in the quantum realm, we are mostly dealing with systems that
encompass a huge number of components, where only statistical statements matter.
Thus the definite probabilistic predictions of quantum mechanics are all we need. Since
we are not concerned with individual objects, the problem of indeterminate quantum
properties becomes irrelevant.
So how about the second threat for mechanistic reasoning, non-localizability (B)?
We shall argue that localizability of parts, while important in many classical
mechanistic explanations, is not an indispensable feature of mechanistic explanation.28
The reason is that the fundamental mode of organization that matters in mechanisms is
causal dependence, not spatial location. It is only when spatial location determines
causal dependence that spatial location is essential to mechanistic explanation. In some
mechanistic systems spatial location is absolutely essential. For instance, in the lawn
mower discussed in section 2, the capacities of the various parts to interact with each
other depend upon them being physically situated in exactly the right way. But in other
thoroughly classical systems this is not the case. Consider for instance a system
consisting of an ensemble of radio transmitters and receivers. Whether a particular
receiver is connected to a particular transmitter will not depend upon its specific
location, but upon whether it is tuned to receive the transmitted frequency. There are in
fact many cases of classical systems where causal organization does not depend upon
spatial organization. For instance, in biochemical mechanisms, organization is largely
determined by the various molecular properties that make some molecules react with
others, rather than on molecules having precise locations within a solution.

27

See Ball (2011) for a brief survey.
Even apart from the potential problems with QM, Bechtel and Richardson (2010, part IV) as well
as Kuhlmann (2011 and forthcoming b) argue that there are various cases where the decomposition of a
system into localized parts with specific stable functions in the whole fails while there are still good
reasons for maintaining that we are dealing with mechanistic explanations. This typically happens in
complex systems.
28
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If it is indeed causal rather than spatiotemporal organization that matters for
mechanisms, we should be able to offer a non-classical but mechanistic explanation of
certain kinds of quantum phenomena. We briefly consider here one such example by
showing the sense in which the quantum-mechanical explanation of laser light is
mechanistic.29 A laser produces light with a very high monochromaticity and intensity,
provided the energy supply exceeds a certain threshold. The quantum theory of laser
radiation starts on the most basic level of quantum field theory, where all the relevant
parts of the laser mechanism are described in detail, e.g. atoms with internal structure
and specific behaviors in isolation and interaction. The most important quantum
mechanical aspect of laser light is the occurrence of stimulated emission of radiation.
Laser theory explains this observable macro-phenomenon in terms of the interacting
subunits, which in this case are the laser active atoms and the resulting electromagnetic
field modes inside the laser. However, the field modes are not spatiotemporally but
functionally characterized. But that is enough for a mechanistic explanation to work.
The decomposition of a compound system into components is a pragmatic matter that is
ultimately justified by its explanatory success. And in the exemplary case of the laser,
understanding field modes as parts does the trick: The field modes interact with the laser
active atoms in such a way as to produce the phenomenon of laser light provided certain
conditions in the set-up are fulfilled, namely in particular the transgression of the laser
threshold for the inserted energy.
One remarkable result of the development of laser theory is how much of the
(semi-) classical reasoning30 carries over to the quantum treatment. Since this continuity
refers in particular to the essential interactive processes that produce laser light, this
indicates that to the extent that (semi-) classical laser theory is mechanistic, so is
quantum laser theory. Remarkably, treating not only the laser-active atoms but also the
radiation field quantum mechanically doesn’t   seem   to   infect   the   explanation   of   laser  
light in its mechanistic nature. One may object that due to the essential role of extended
fields,   i.e.   “objects”   that   are   not   localized,   (semi-)   classical   laser   theory   itself   isn’t  
mechanistic and thus neither is quantum laser theory. However, this is the same
situation as in our above consideration of an ensemble of radio transmitters and
receivers, and there we have already pointed out why a mechanistic reading pertains.
In some cases, however, non-separability and the resulting quantum holism (C)
may present an insuperable boundary to mechanistic explanation, because even the
complete specification of parts and their spatio-temporal organization does not
determine  all  properties  of  the  composite  system.  Hence,  mechanistic  reasoning  doesn’t
always seem to work.
Now one may argue that the specification of how the parts are organized in the
whole must not only encompass external spatio-temporal but also internal relations,
which  refer  to  the  entanglement  correlations  between  the  system’s parts.31 However, we
think that this move would be against the spirit of the mechanistic approach because
entanglement relations are inherently global. For similar reasons Darby 2012 argues that
enriching the supervenience basis by entanglement relations leads away from David
29

For the full story see Kuhlmann (forthcoming a).
In “semi-classical” laser theory only the atoms are described by quantum mechanics while the
field in the laser cavity is treated as a classical electrical field.
31
See Teller’s (1986) proposal of  “relational  holism”  and  the  discussion  in  Schaffer  (2010, 50-57).
30
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Lewis’  metaphysical  thesis  of  “Humean  supervenience”,  i.e.  the  idea  that  the  world  is  a  
mosaic of local particular facts.32 But do these considerations by the same token
undermine mechanistic explanations for genuinely quantum mechanical phenomena? –
We think they do not.
What   if  those  properties  of  the  composite  quantum   system  that  aren’t  determined  
by a complete specification of its parts and their external relations, are simply not the
ones we need in our explanation? It is not the case that nothing is determined by the
parts and their external relations. And in fact, in many scientific contexts we only need
to know those properties that are determined by the parts and their external relations:
They alone determine exactly what is crucial for mechanisms, namely the dynamics of
the compound system.33 The reason is that the dynamics of a quantum-mechanical
compound system is determined by its total energy, represented by the so-called
Hamiltonian, which is neatly split up into parts that comprise the behavior of the
system’s  components  in  isolation,  the  interactions  between  these  components  (described  
by interaction terms), and with any other relevant systems. In our quantum-mechanical
laser, for instance, the Hamiltonian for the atoms inside the laser sums over the
Hamiltonians of all the single atoms, i.e. each atom has its own Hamiltonian –
notwithstanding the indistinguishability of   “identical   quantum   particles.”   The  
electromagnetic field modes, i.e. oscillations with different wavelengths, are also treated
as independent parts, which interact with the laser active atoms. Now, the crucial point
is that the dynamics of the compound system is determined by the total Hamiltonian,
which is given by simply adding up the Hamiltonians for the subunits.34 There are no
tensor products for Hamiltonians, and thus, neither is there an entanglement of
Hamiltonians.35 While we make this argument for lasers, the same argument will apply
to many other systems. Even in those systems for which quantum entanglements are
locally detectable and not irreversibly spread out into the environment by decoherence,
mechanistic explanations (and mechanistic ontology) will still work so long as the
specific entanglement correlations are irrelevant to the behavior of the system we want
to explain. Hence threat (C) plays no role. Only if entanglement correlations are
relevant for the dynamics are mechanistic explanations no longer possible.36
32

As Maudlin (1998, 60) nicely puts  it,  “[t]he  world  is  not  just  a  set  of  separately  existing  localized  
objects, externally related only by space and time. Something deeper, and more mysterious, knits together
the  fabric  of  the  world.”
33
Note that this essential fact is important not only for the explanatory aspect of mechanisms but
also for its ontological one.
34
Hüttemann (2005) discusses in detail what this point implies for the issue of emergence in
entangled systems.
35
Using the total energy one can derive differential equations for how the various parts of the laser
will evolve in time. This leads to a huge system of equations, which in addition are coupled with each
other. One crucial starting point for solving this almost intractable system of equations is the empirical
observation that there is a hierarchy of time scales: The slowly varying quantities, namely the field
modes, can be treated as constant (in time) in comparison to the other quantities that change much faster.
Eventually, one particular field mode wins the competition and dominates the beat, so to say. As a
consequence, only one dominant mode of the light field emerges, giving rise to laser light.
36
We think that this is the case for the dynamics of so-called   “EPR experiments”,   e.g.   for  
measurements of spin-correlated pairs of electrons. What happens in these experiments cannot be
explained   mechanistically.   However,   this   doesn’t   seem   to   be   much   of   a   limitation   for   the   EPR
experiments may not be sufficiently explainable at all as of now. Dorato and Felline (2011) explore
whether   there   may   be   at   least   “structural explanations”   of non-local quantum correlations, beyond a
commitment to ontic structural realism.
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In conclusion, we think it is appropriate to say that the behavior of a composite
quantum system is, under circumstances like those of the laser, due to what we call a
“non-classical mechanism”:  The mechanistic explanation shows how a stable behavior
of a compound system reliably arises purely on the basis of the interaction of its
constituents, where it is the causal organization that matters and the spatiotemporal
organization remains almost completely unspecified. One important difference between
this case and our case of the classical set of transmitters and receivers is that in the
classical case, it is possible to attribute locations to the parts while in the non-classical
case it is not. But whether classical or non-classical, spatial organization is in both cases
irrelevant to the mechanistic explanation.
While we believe that the laser example shows how mechanistic explanation
extends into the quantum domain, we do not mean thereby to suggest that all
explanation in the quantum domain is mechanistic. We have emphasized that in
circumstances in which entanglement plays an essential role in the explanation of some
phenomenon, mechanistic explanation is not possible. Moreover, we believe that there
are many high-standard explanations (both classical and non-classical) that are not
mechanistic. For instance, many explanations ignore mechanistic causal processes and
appeal to abstract features of systems, e.g., by appeal to conservation laws, symmetry
considerations and dimensional analysis.37 Explanations  of  “non-classical mechanisms”  
deserve to be called mechanistic because they share a lot with classical mechanistic
explanations, and are quite different from these non-mechanistic explanations, whether
classical or non-classical.

6

Conclusion

Let us take stock of what we have learned. We have argued that even though
decoherence   doesn’t   solve   the   global   conceptual   problems   of   quantum   mechanics   it  
helps considerably in abrogating worries that local mechanistic explanations may be
undermined by the universal validity of quantum physics. Mechanistic explanations are
concerned with the local causes of local phenomena that occur within the world. For
instance, why do flocks of birds so often form the inverted-1-shaped form often seen in
autumn? A mechanistic explanation explains how this local phenomenon arises through
the local interaction of the birds; global entanglements between the birds (and their
constituents) and the rest of the universe are (to a high approximation) not causally or
explanatorily relevant to the production of this phenomenon.
A central tenet of the mechanistic approach to causation and explanation is that
mechanisms are particulars, and this entails that they are local in the sense we have
described. The phenomenon that a mechanism produces is a local phenomenon, and the
parts and their interactions that produce the phenomenon are local as well. If the
explanandum concerns the local behavior of a system that behaves classically, and if
there is an explanation of that behavior that refers to entities and activities that
themselves behave classically, this explanation is not undermined by locally
37

There is a recent discussion about the explanation of universal macro behavior, e.g. identical
phase transition behavior in gases and liquids, in terms of renormalization group methods. Batterman
(2000) and Reutlinger (forthcoming) argue that this is best construed as a non-causal and a fortiori nonmechanistic type of explanation.
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undetectable global entanglements of these entities and their interactions. Moreover,
the sorts of systems that are most clearly amenable to mechanistic explanation (e.g.,
biological systems) are open systems (i.e., systems that interact with their environment),
and are thus systems for which the decoherence approach can be legitimately invoked.
Beyond this, we have argued that even within domains where the behavior of
systems must be explained by appeal to non-classical components, some explanations
are still mechanistic. At its core, the mechanistic approach involves explaining the
behaviors of systems in terms of the properties of their parts. Such explanatory
strategies are sometimes available even within the domain of quantum mechanics.

7

References

Bacciagaluppi, G. 2012. The role of decoherence in quantum mechanics. The Stanford
encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/qm-decoherence/.
Ball, P. 2011. Physics of life: The dawn of quantum biology. Nature 474: 272-274.
Band, Y. B. and Y. Avishai. 2013. Quantum mechanics, with applications to
nanotechnology and information science. Oxford and Amsterdam: Academic Press
(Elsevier).
Batterman,  R.  2000.  “Multiple  realizability and universality.”  British journal for
philosophy of science 51: 115-145.
Batterman, R. 2010. On the explanatory role of mathematics in empirical science.
British journal for philosophy of science 61: 1-25.
Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. 2005. Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies
in the history and philosophy of biology and the biomedical sciences 36(2): 421441.
Bechtel, W., and R. C. Richardson. 2010. Discovering complexity: decomposition and
localization as strategies in scientific research, second Edition. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press/Bradford Books.
Busch, P., P.J. Lahti, and P. Mittelstaedt. 1996. The Quantum theory of measurement.
Berlin: Springer.
Craver, C. F. 2007. Explaining the brain. Oxford: Clarendon Oxford Press
Craver, C. F. 2013. Functions and Mechanisms: A Perspectivalist View. Functions:
selection and mechanisms, ed. P. Huneman, pp. 133–158. Dordrecht: Springer
Netherlands. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4
Cushing, J. T. 1998. Philosophical concepts in physics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Darby, G. 2012. Relational holism and Humean supervenience. British journal for the
philosophy of science, 63: 773-788.
Darden, L. 2008. Thinking again about biological mechanisms. Philosophy of science,
75(5), 958–969.
Dorato M., and L. Felline. 2011. Scientific explanation and scientific structuralism. In
Scientific structuralism, eds. A. Bokulich and P. Bokulich, 161-176. Dordrecht:
Springer.
22

Einstein, A. 1917. Zur Quantentheorie der Strahlung. Physikalische Zeitschrift 18: 121128.
Glennan, S.S. 2011. Singular and general causal relations: a mechanist perspective. In
Causality in the sciences, eds. P. McKay Illari, F. Russo & J. Williamson, 789-817.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Glennan, S.S. 2010. Mechanisms. The Oxford handbook of causation, eds. Helen
Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock and Peter Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Glennan, S.S. 2008. Mechanisms. In Routledge companion to the philosophy of science,
eds. M. Curd & S. Psillos, 376-384. New York: Routledge.
Glennan, S.S. 2002. Rethinking mechanistic explanation. Philosophy of science 69:
S342-S353.
Glennan, S.S. 1996. Mechanisms and the nature of causation, Erkenntnis 44: 49-71.
Haken, H. 1985. Light, Vol. 2: Laser light dynamics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Halvorson, H. and R. Clifton 2002. No place for particles in relativistic quantum
theories? Philosophy of science, 69: 1-28; reprinted in Ontological Aspects of
Quantum Field Theory, eds. M. Kuhlmann, H. Lyre and A. Wayne. London:
World Scientific Publishing, 2002.
Hartmann, S. 2008. Modeling high-temperature superconductors: correspondence at
bay? In Rethinking scientific change. Stabilities, ruptures, incommensurabilities?,
ed. L. Soler. Berlin: Springer.
Healey, R. 2009. Holism and Nonseparability in Physics. The Stanford encyclopedia of
philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/physics-holism/.
Hegerfeldt, G.C. 1998. Instantaneous spreading and Einstein causality in quantum
theory. Annalen der Physik 7: 716-725.
Hitchcock, C. 2011. Probabilistic causation. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy
(Winter 2011 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/win2011/entries/causation-probabilistic/.
Hüttemann, A. 2005. Explanation, emergence and quantum-entanglement, Philosophy
of science 72: 114–127.
Illari, P.M. & Williamson, J. 2012. What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms
across the sciences. European journal for philosophy of science 2: 119-135.
Joos, E., H.D. Zeh, C. Kiefer, D. Giulini, J. Kupsch, and I. O. Stamatescu. 2003.
Decoherence and the appearance of a classical world in quantum theory. Berlin:
Springer.
Kuhlmann, M. 2010. The ultimate constituents of the material world - in search of an
ontology for fundamental physics. Frankfurt: Ontos Publishing House.
Kuhlmann, M. 2011. Mechanisms in dynamically complex systems. In Causality in the
sciences, eds. P. McKay Illari, F. Russo & J. Williamson, 880-906. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Kuhlmann, M. forthcoming a. A mechanistic reading of quantum laser theory, in: (ed.):
Why is more different? Philosophical issues in condensed matter physics and
complex systems, eds. Brigitte Falkenburg and Margaret Morrison. Berlin:
Springer.
23

Kuhlmann, M. forthcoming b. Explaining financial markets in terms of complex
systems [Final decision on acceptance pending].
Ladyman, A. and D. Ross. 2007. Every thing must go: Metaphysics naturalized. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Landsman, N.P. 2007. Between classical and quantum. Handbook of the philosophy of
science, Vol. 2: Philosophy of physics, eds. J. Butterfield and J. Earman, 417-554.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Machamer, P. 2004. Activities and causation: the metaphysics and epistemology of
mechanisms. International studies in the philosophy of science, 18(1), 27–39.
Machamer, P., L. Darden, & C.F. Craver. 2000. Thinking about mechanisms.
Philosophy of science, 67: 1-25.
Maudlin, T. 1998. Part and whole in quantum mechanics, In Interpreting bodies:
classical and quantum objects in modern physics, ed. E. Castellani. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
McKay Illari, P. & Williamson, J. 2011. Mechanisms are real and local. In Causality in
the sciences, eds. P. McKay Illari, F. Russo & J. Williamson, 818-844. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Mittelstaedt. P. 1998. The Interpretation of quantum mechanics and the measurement
process. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morganti, M. 2009. Ontological priority, fundamentality and monism. Dialectica, 63(3),
271–288.
Nairz, O., M. Arndt, and A. Zeilinger 2003. Quantum interference experiments with
large molecules. American journal of physics 71: 319–325.
Neumann, J. von 1932. Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik. Berlin:
Springer. English translation 1955. Mathematical Foundations of Quantum
Mechanics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pettit, P. 1993. A definition of physicalism. Analysis 53: 213–23.
Planck, M. 1901. Über das Gesetz der Energieverteilung im Normalspectrum. Annalen
der Physik 4: 553-563.
Reutlinger, A. (forthcoming). Why is there universal macro-behavior? renormalization
group explanation as non-causal explanation. Philosophy of science.
Schaffer, J. 2003. Is there a fundamental level? Noûs 37: 498–517.
Schaffer, J. 2010. Monism. The Priority of the Whole. Philosophical review, 119: 3176.
Erhard Scheibe 1973. The Logical analysis of quantum mechanics. Oxford and New
York: Pergamon Press.
Schlosshauer, M. 2007. Decoherence and the quantum-to-classical transition.
Heidelberg and Berlin: Springer.
Suárez, M. 2007: Quantum propensities. Studies in history and philosophy of modern
physics 38: 418-438.
Tabery, J. G. 2004. Synthesizing activities and interactions in the concept of a
mechanism. Philosophy of science, 71(1), 1–15.
Teller, P. 1986. Relational holism and quantum mechanics. British journal for the
philosophy of science 37: 71-81
24

Tonomura, A., J. Endo, T. Matsuda, T. Kawasaki, and H. Ezawa. 1989. Demonstration
of single-electron buildup of an interference pattern. American journal of physics
57: 117–120.
Wallace, D. 2012. The emergent multiverse: quantum theory according to the Everett
interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wallace, D. forthcoming. Decoherence and its role in the modern measurement
problem, http://arxiv.org/abs/arXiv:1111.2187 (to appear in a special issue of
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London, ed. A. Hagar).
Woodward, J. 2011. Mechanisms revisited. Synthese, 183(3), 409–427.
Zurek, W.H. 1981. Pointer basis of quantum apparatus: into what mixture does the wave
packet collapse? Physical review D24: 1516–1525.
Zurek, W.H. 1982. Environment-induced superselections rules. Physical review D26:
1862–1880.
Zurek, W.H. 1991. Decoherence and the transition from quantum to classical. Physics
today 44: 36–44.
Zurek, W.H. 2002. Decoherence and the transition from quantum to classical—
Revisited. Reviews of modern physics 27: 2-25.
Zurek, W.H. 2003. Decoherence, einselection, and the quantum origins of the classical.
Reviews of modern physics 75: 715–775.

25

